Egalitarian-Equivalence and the Pareto Principle for Social Preferences by Tadenuma, Koichi
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title








RightEgalitarian-Equivalence and the Pareto
Principle for Social Preferences∗
Koichi Tadenuma†
This version: September 2002
First version: July 2002
Abstract
When we construct social preferences, the Pareto principle is of-
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an allocation x higher than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x
and y are Pareto-noncomparable and x is equitable whereas y is not.
The equity-ﬁrst principle reverses the order of application of the two
criteria. Adopting egalitarian-equivalence as the notion of equity, we
examine rationality of the social preference functions based on the
eﬃciency-ﬁrst or the equity-ﬁrst principle. The degrees of rationality
vary widely depending on which principle is adopted, and depending
on the range of egalitarian-reference bundles. We show several impos-
sibility and possibility results as well as a characterization of the social
preference function introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). We
also identify the sets of maximal allocations of the social preference
relations in an Edgeworth box. The results are contrasted with those
in the case where no-envy is the notion of equity.
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11 Introduction
As is often criticized, the Pareto principle is silent about distributional eq-
uity. Several important notions of equitable allocations that depend only on
ordinal individual preferences have been proposed and studied extensively
in the theory of fair allocation. Among others, the concepts of no-envy and
egalitarian-equivalence are central.1 In the literature of fair allocation, au-
thors usually focus only on the “optimal” allocations in a feasible set. How-
ever, several notable attempts have been made to incorporate the ideas of
distributional equity into construction of social orderings of all allocations,
following the tradition of Arrovian social choice theory (Arrow, 1951). Such
contributions include Feldman and Kirman (1974), Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978), G¨ ardenfors (1978), Suzumura (1981a,b, 1996), Fleurbaey and Mani-
quet (2001), Fleurbaey (2001) and Tadenuma (2002).
It is important to construct a reasonable social ordering of all allocations,
not just identifying “optimal” allocations. Indeed, it is quite rare in the
real world that we could choose an “optimal” allocation among all feasible
allocations, but rather, we are often faced with choice between several “non-
optimal” allocations.
A most natural way to incorporate the idea of equitable allocations would
be to rank an allocation x higher than an allocation y if x is equitable but y is
not. However, even this weakest requirement has to conﬂict with the Pareto
principle: there exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y,
but x is not equitable while y is. The fundamental conﬂict between eﬃciency
and equity was ﬁrst observed by Kolm (1971) in the case of no-envy as the
concept of equity.
Faced with the conﬂict between eﬃciency and no-envy, Tadenuma (1998,
2002) proposed two contrasting principles to construct social preference re-
lations: The eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle requires to rank an allocation x higher
than y if (i) x Pareto dominates y or (ii) x and y are Pareto-noncomparable
and x is envy-free whereas y is not. The equity-ﬁrst principle reverses the
order of application of the two criteria.
In this paper, we focus on another important concept of equity,
egalitarian-equivalence: an allocation x is egalitarian-equivalent if there ex-
ists a consumption bundle a0 such that every agent is indiﬀerent between
1An envy-free allocation was introduced by Kolm (1971) and Foley (1967), and an
egalitarian-equivalent allocation was proposed by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978).
2his consumption bundle at x and the bundle a0. The bundle a0 is called an
egalitarian-reference bundle. Just like Pareto eﬃciency and no-envy, this con-
cept of equity depends only on ordinal preferences of individuals. We study
rules to construct social preferences over all allocations, or simply social pref-
erence functions, based on the Pareto criterion and the equity criterion as
egalitarian-equivalence.
First we observe a conﬂict between the two criteria: there exist allocations
x and y such that x Pareto dominates y whereas y is egalitarian-equivalent
but x is not. The two criteria are completely opposed to each other on which
allocation is socially more desirable. Hence, in order to rank allocations, we
need to give priority to one criterion over the other.
We examine rationality (or choice-consistency) properties of social prefer-
ence functions based on either the eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle or the equity-ﬁrst
principle. It is shown that there exists no social preference function satis-
fying the eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle and acyclicity together if no restriction is
imposed on the range of egalitarian-reference bundles. However, if we ﬁx
a ray from the origin, and take only egalitarian-reference bundles on the
ray, then there exist social preference functions satisfying the eﬃciency-ﬁrst
principle and transitivity. An example is the social preference function pro-
posed by Pazner-Schmeidler (1978), which has been characterized nicely by
Fleurbaey (2001). Based on the eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle, we present another
characterization of the Pazer-Schmeidler social preference function. Turning
to the equity-ﬁrst principle, there exist social preference functions satisfy-
ing the equity-ﬁrst principle and transitivity. The result holds whether the
range of reference bundles is restricted or not. However, no social preference
function satisﬁes these conditions and continuity together.
We also identify the maximal allocations of the social preference relations
in an Edgeworth box. In contrast with the case where no-envy is the con-
cept of equity, the set of maximal allocations of the coarsest eﬃciency-ﬁrst
relation always coincides with that of the coarsest equity-ﬁrst relation, and
the maximal set of any social preference relation based either of the two
principles is a subset of this set.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
notation and the basic concepts. In section 3, we formulate axioms for so-
cial preference functions, including ones that reﬂect the eﬃciency-ﬁrst or the
equity-ﬁrst principle. Section 4 examines rationality (choice-consistency) of
social preference functions. Maximal allocations in an Edgeworth are inves-
tigated in section 5. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
32 Pareto and Egalitarian-Equivalence
There are n agents and m inﬁnitely divisible goods, where n and m are
some ﬁnite numbers. Let N = {1,···,n} be the set of agents. Denoting
by R the set of real numbers, the consumption set of each agent is Rm
+. Let
R be the class of preference relations on Rm
+ that are reﬂexive, transitive,
complete, continuous, and strictly monotonic. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed
with a preference relation Ri in R. The strict preference relation and the
indiﬀerence relation associated with Ri are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively.
A list of preference relations, (Ri)i∈N ∈R n, is called a preference proﬁle, and
denoted by RN.
An allocation is a vector x =( x1,···,x n) ∈ Rmn
+ where each xi =
(xi1,···,x im) ∈ Rm
+ is a consumption bundle of agent i ∈ N. The set of
all allocations is denoted by X.2
Let RN ∈R n be given. An allocation x ∈ X Pareto dominates an
allocation y ∈ X if xi Ri yi for all i ∈ N and xi Pi yi for some i ∈ N.I f
x Pareto dominates y, we write x  P y. An allocation x strongly Pareto
dominates an allocation y if xi Pi yi for all i ∈ N.I f x strongly Pareto
dominates y, we write x  SP y. Given a set Z ⊂ X, an allocation x ∈ Z
is Pareto eﬃcient in Z if there is no y ∈ Z with y  P x. Let P(Z) be the
set of Pareto eﬃcient allocaitons in Z. An allocation x ∈ X is egalitarian-
equivalent if there is a consumption bundle a0 ∈ Rm
+ such that for all i ∈ N,
xi Ii a0. Then, the bundle a0 is called an egalitarian-reference bundle for x.
For each Z ⊆ X, let E(Z) denote the set of egalitarian-equivalent allocations
in Z. We simply write E(X)=E.
A particular subset of egalitarian-equivalent allocations can be deﬁned
by restricting the range of reference bundles. A natural restriction may be
to take only reference bundles that are proportional to some basic vector.
Formally, given ¯ r ∈ Rm
++, an allocation x ∈ X is said to be egalitarian-
equivalent for a ﬁxed reference ray with ¯ r or simply ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent
if there is a real number λ ∈ R+ such that for all i ∈ N, xi Ii λ¯ r.F o r
each Z ⊆ X, let E¯ r(Z) be the set of ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent allocations. Let
E¯ r(X)=E¯ r.
For all x,y ∈ Rmn
+ ,i fx ∈ E and y/ ∈ E, then we write x  E y. Similarly,
if x ∈ E¯ r and y/ ∈ E¯ r, then we write x  E¯ r y.
2We assume that X = Rmn
+ . However, we might impose a resource constraint and let X
be the set of all feasible allocations: given some ﬁxed Ω ∈ Rm




Ω}. All the results in this paper hold with this deﬁnition of X.
4Let Q be the set of reﬂexive binary relations on X.A social preference
function is a mapping f : Rn →Q . For each RN ∈R n,   = f(RN)i s
called the social preference relation at RN. In the following, we denote by
  the social preference relation f(RN) at a given RN ∈R n, and by   its
asymmetric part. Given   and Z ⊂ X, an allocation x ∈ Z is a maximal
element in Z for   if there is no y ∈ Z such that y   x. Let M(Z, )b e
the set of maximal elements in Z for  .
A social preference relation   ∈Qis said to be a reﬁnement of  ∈Qif
 ⊂    and    =   . If this is the case, we also say that   is coaser than   .
A social preference function f is a reﬁnement of a social preference function
g if for all RN ∈R n, f(RN) is a reﬁnement of g(RN).
3 Axioms for Social Preference Functions
We formulate properties, or axioms for social preference functions, and ex-
amine the existence of a function satisfying the axioms.
The ﬁrst two axioms have been playing a central role in welfare economics
and social choice theory.
Pareto: For all RN ∈R n and all x,y ∈ X,i fx  P y, then x   y.
Weak Pareto: For all RN ∈R n and all x,y ∈ X,i fx  SP y, then x   y.
The next two axioms mean that if x is equitable in the sense of egalitarian-
equivalence (or ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence) but y is not, then x should be re-
garded as socially more desirable than y.
Egalitarian-Equivalence: For all RN ∈R n and all x,y ∈ X,i fx  E y,
then x   y.
¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence: There exists ¯ r ∈ Rm
+ such that for all RN ∈
Rn and all x,y ∈ X,i fx  E¯ r y, then x   y.
There is no logical relation between Egalitarian-Equivalence and ¯ r-
Egalitarian-Equivalence. To check this, consider the social preference func-
tion f deﬁne as follows: for all RN ∈R n, and all x,y ∈ X, x   y if and
only if x ∈ E or y/ ∈ E. Given ¯ r ∈ Rm
+, deﬁne another social preference
function f  as follows: for all RN ∈R n, and all x,y ∈ X, x    y if and
5only if x ∈ E¯ r or y/ ∈ E¯ r. Clearly, f satisﬁes Egalitarian-Equivalence, and
f  satisﬁes ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence. Choose RN,R  
N ∈R n such that there
exist x,y,z ∈ X with x ∈ E¯ r, y ∈ E but y/ ∈ E¯ r, and z/ ∈ E. Then, although
x  E¯ r y, x   y does not hold. Hence, f does not satisfy ¯ r-Egalitarian-
Equivalence. On the other hand, y    z does not hold despite y  E z. Thus,
f  does not satisfy Egalitarian-Equivalence.
As we will see later, the two axioms, Pareto and Egalitarian-Equivalence
(or Pareto and ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence), conﬂict with each other. Hence,
we propose to apply one criterion only conditionally on the other. First,
we apply the equity criterion only when the Pareto criterion does not make
strict orders.
P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence: For all RN ∈R n and all x,y ∈
X,i fx   P y, y   P x, and x  E y, then x   y.
P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence: For all RN ∈R n and all
x,y ∈ X,i fx   P y, y   P x, and x  E¯ r y, then x   y.
The above two axioms may be strengthened by replacing [x   P y, y   P
x] with [x   SP y, y   SP x] in the hypotheses. With this strengthening,
however, the axioms become too strong to be compatible with Pareto. Hence,
we only consider the above versions.
Symmetrically, we may apply the Pareto criterion only if the equity cri-
terion does not make strict rankings.
E-Conditional Pareto: For all RN ∈R n and all x,y ∈ X,i fx   E y,
y   E x, and x  P y, then x   y.
E¯ r-Conditional Pareto: For all RN ∈R n and all x,y ∈ X,i fx   E¯ r y,
y   E¯ r x, and x  P y, then x   y.
Another important requirement for social preference functions is ratio-
nality or choice-consistency in the sense of transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or
acyclicity of the social preference relations generated by the functions.
Transitivity: For all RN ∈R n and all x,y,z ∈ X,i fx   y and y   z, then
x   z.
Quasi-Transitivity: For all RN ∈R n and all x,y,z ∈ X,i fx   y and
y   z, then x   z.
6Acyclicity: For all RN ∈R n, all integer k with k ≥ 3, and all x1,...,x k ∈
X,i fx    x +1 for all   ∈{ 1,...,k− 1}, then xk    x1.
It is also desirable to have complete and continuous social preference
relations.
Completeness: For all RN ∈R n and all x,y ∈ X, x   y or y   x.
Continuity: For all RN ∈R n and all x ∈ X, both {y ∈ X | y   x} and
{y ∈ X | x   y} are closed in X.
4 Rationality of Social Preference Functions
Our ﬁrst result is incompatibility of the Pareto principle with Egalitarian-
Equivalence (or ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence).
Proposition 1 There exists no social preference function satisfying Weak
Pareto and Egalitarian-Equivalence. There exists no social preference func-
tion satisfying Weak Pareto and ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence.
Proof. For simplicity, consider an economy with two agents N = {1,2} and
two goods 1,2. Let f be a social preference function. Assume that R1 = R2
and the preference relation is represented by the following utility function:
ui(xi1,x i2)=xi1 +3 xi2 if xi2 ≤ xi1
ui(xi1,x i2)=3 xi1 + xi2 if xi2 ≥ xi1
Deﬁne x =( x1,x 2) = ((8,2),(2,8)), y =( y1,y 2) = ((6,6),(4,4)) and ¯ r =
(1,1). Then, the allocation y strongly Pareto dominates the allocation x.
Hence, if the social preference function f satisﬁes Weak Pareto, then we
must have y   x.
On the other hand, since u1(x1)=u1(
7
2¯ r) and u2(x2)=u2(
7
2¯ r), the
allocation x is ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent with
7
2¯ r being the reference bundle.
However, since R1 = R2 and y1   y2, there cannot exist a0 ∈ X such that
y1 I1 a0 and y2 I2 a0. Hence, y is not egalitarian-equivalent. Thus, if f
satisﬁes Egalitarian-Equivalence or ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, then x   y
must hold. But we cannot have both y   x and x   y.
From the above result, we have to rely on the conditional version of either
the Pareto principle or the equity criterion. Next we examine rationality
7properties of social preference functions satisfying
(1) Pareto and P-Conditional (¯ r-)Egalitarian-Equivalence, or
(2) (¯ r-)Egalitarian-Equivalence and (¯ r-)E-Conditional Pareto.
If we accept Pareto as the ﬁrst principle and Egalitarian-Equivalence as
the second without imposing restrictions on the range of reference bundles,
then even the minimal requirement of rationality cannot be met.
Proposition 2 There exists no social preference function satisfying Weak
Pareto, P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence, and Acyclicity.3
Proof. (See Figures 1 and 2.) Consider an economy with two agents
N = {1,2} and two goods 1,2. Let f be a social preference function satisfy-
ing Weak Pareto and P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence. We show that
there exists RN ∈R n such that   = f(RN) has a cycle.
Assume that R1 is represented by the following piecewise linear utility
function:
u1(x11,x 12)=x11 +1 3 x12 if x12 ≤ x11
u1(x11,x 12)=1 3 x11 + x12 if x12 ≥ x11,
and R2 is represented by the following piecewise linear utility function:
u2(x21,x 22)=x21 +1 3 x22
if x22 ≤ x21
u2(x21,x 22)=7 ( x21 + x22)




(13x21 + x22 + 240)
if x22 ≥ 20 and x22 ≤− 13x21 + 280
u2(x21,x 22)=1 3 x21 + x22
if x22 ≥ x21 and x22 ≥− 13x21 + 280
Deﬁne x,y,z,w ∈ X by x = ((19,9),(9,19)), y = ((13,10),(15,18)),
z = ((24,10),(4,18)) and w = ((17,15),(11,13)).4 Then, observe the fol-
lowing facts:
3This result was ﬁrst reported in Tadenuma (1998).
4Notice that the total amounts of resources at each of the four allocations are the
same. Hence, the result holds true even if we consider only feasible allocations with no






















Figure 1: Preferences of Agent 1 and Agent 2
(1) The allocation y strongly Pareto dominates the allocation x.
(2) Also, w strongly Pareto dominates z.
(3) However, y and z are Pareto noncomparable.
(4) Similarly, x and w are Pareto noncomparable.
(5) On the other hand, the allocation x is egalitarian-equivalent with the
reference bundle (9,19) since u1(x1)=u1(9,19) and u2(x2)=u2(9,19).
(6) Similarly, z is egalitarian equivalent with the reference bundle a0 =
(11,11).
(7) However, y is not egalitarian-equivalent. This can be checked by noting
that:
(i) y1 I1 t if and only if [t2 = −13t1+143 and 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 143
14 ]o r[ t2 = − 1
13t1+11
and t1 ≥ 143
14 ], and
(ii) y2 I2 t if and only if [t2 = −13t1 +189 and 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 13] or [t2 = −t1 +33
and 13 ≤ t1 ≤
33




13 and t1 ≥
33
2 ].
Hence, there exists no t ∈ R2
+ such that y1 I1 t and y2 I2 t. (Figure 2)
(8) Similarly, it can be shown that w is not egalitarian-equivalent.
Since f satisﬁes Weak Pareto, it follows from (1) that y   x. Because f













Figure 2: Allocations y and w are not egalitarian-equivalent.
have z   y. Similarly, by (2), w   z. Finally, from (4), (5) and (8) together,
it must be true that x   w. Thus, the relation   has a cycle.
Notice that in the above proof, we have considered two egalitarian-
equivalent allocations such that their reference bundles cannot be on one
monotone path from the origin in the consumption space. In fact, this has
caused the cycle in the social preference relation. If we restrict the range
of egalitarian-reference bundles on a ﬁxed monotone path (or for simplic-
ity, some ﬁxed ray) from the origin, then we have a positive result: there
exists a social preference function satisfying Weak Pareto, P-Conditional
¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, and Transitivity. A good example is the social
preference function due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978).
The Pazner-Schmeidler function, f
P
S: Fix a vector ¯ r ∈ Rm
++. For each
RN ∈R ,  PS= fPS(RN) is deﬁned as follows: For each i ∈ N and each
xi ∈ Rm
+, let λi(xi) ∈ R+ be such that xi Ii λi(xi)¯ r. Then, for all x,y ∈ X,
x  PS y ⇔ mini∈N λi(xi) ≥ mini∈N λi(yi).
10A reﬁnement of the Pazner-Schmeidler function, which also satisﬁes the
Pareto principle, can be obtained by lexicographic comparison of the vectors
(λi(xi))i∈N.
Recently, Fleurbaey (2001) has characterized the Pazner-Schmeidler func-
tion by the axioms, Transitivity, Weak Pareto, and “Minimal Equity for Pro-
portional Allocations,”5 which is a weakening of the equity concept due to
Hammond (1976). Next, we present another simple characterization of the
Pazner-Schmeidler function by the axioms, Quasi-Transitivity, Weak Pareto,
and P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence. Note that there is no logical
relation between P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence and Mimimal Eq-
uity for Proportional Allocations.
Proposition 3 The Pazner-Schmeidler function satisﬁes Weak Pareto,
P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, Transitivity, Completeness, and
Continuity. If a social preference function satisﬁes Weak Pareto, P-
Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, and Quasi-Transitivity, then it is the
Pazner-Schmeidler function or a reﬁnement.
Proof. It is clear that the Pazner-Schmeidler function fPS satisﬁes Transi-
tivity, Completeness, Continuity and Weak Pareto. We show that it satisﬁes
P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence. Let RN ∈R n and  PS= fPS(RN).
Let x,y ∈ X be such that x   P y, y   P x, and x ∈ E¯ r but y  ∈ E¯ r.W e
need to show that x  PS y.I fxi Ii yi for all i ∈ N, then either x,y ∈ E¯ r or
x,y / ∈ E¯ r, which is a contradiction. Hence, there exists h ∈ N with xh Ph yh.
Then, λh(xh)¯ rI h xh Ph yh Ih λh(yh)¯ r. By monotonicity of Rh, we have
λh(xh) >λ h(yh). Since x ∈ E¯ r, it follows that for all i ∈ N, λi(xi)=λh(xh).
Thus, mini∈N λi(xi)=λh(xh) >λ h(yh) ≥ mini∈N λi(yi). Therefore, x  PS y.
Next we prove the second part. Let f be a social preference function
satisfying Weak Pareto, P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, and Quasi-
Transitivity. Let RN ∈R n be given. We need to show that  PS ⊂  , that
is, for all x,y ∈ X,i fx  PS y, then x   y. Suppose that x  PS y. Then,
minj∈N λj(xj) > minj∈N λj(yj). We distinguish two cases.
5Minimal Equity for Proportional Allocations I: Fix Ω ∈ Rm
++. For all x,y ∈ X,
if (i) for all i ∈ N, xi = αiΩ and yi = βiΩ for some αi,β i ∈ R+,
(ii) W(x) ≡{ i ∈ N | xi = minj∈N xj} = {i ∈ N | yi = minj∈N yj} and B(x) ≡{ i ∈ N |
xi = maxj∈N xj} = {i ∈ N | yi = maxj∈N yj},
(iii) for all i ∈ W(x), yi <x i, and for all i ∈ B(x), yi >x i,
(iv) for all k ∈ N\[W(x) ∪ B(x)], xk = yk,
then x   y.
11Case 1: maxj∈N λj(yj) < minj∈N λj(xj).
For all i ∈ N, xi Ii λi(xi)¯ rR i [minj∈N λj(xj)]¯ rP i [maxj∈N λj(yj)]¯ rR i
λi(yi)¯ rI i yi. By Weak Pareto, x   y.
Case 2: maxj∈N λj(yj) ≥ minj∈N λj(xj).
Let λ∗ =
1
2[minj∈N λj(xj) + minj∈N λj(yj)]. Note that minj∈N λj(yj) <λ ∗ <
minj∈N λj(xj) ≤ maxj∈N λj(yj). Deﬁne z ∈ X by zi = λ∗¯ r for all i ∈ N.
Then, for all i ∈ N, xi Ii λi(xi)¯ rR i [minj∈N λj(xj)]¯ rP i λ∗¯ r = zi. By Weak
Pareto, x   z. On the other hand, let h,k ∈ N be such that λh(yh)=
maxj∈N λj(yj) and λk(yk) = minj∈N λj(yj). Then, yh Ih λh(yh)¯ rP h λ∗¯ r = zh
whereas zk = λ∗¯ rP k λk(yk)¯ rI k yk. Thus, there is no Pareto domination rela-
tion between y and z. Notice that z is an ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent allocation,
while y is not because λh(yh) >λ k(yk). By P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-
Equivalence, we have z   y. From Quasi-Transitivity, x   y.
Corollary 1 The Pazner-Schmeidler function is the unique social pref-
erence function that satisﬁes Weak Pareto, P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-
Equivalence, Quasi-Transitivity, and Continuity.
Proof. The statement follows from the above proposition and Lemma 2 in
Fleurbaey (2001).
If we adopt egalitarian-equivalence as the ﬁrst criterion, and impose the
Pareto principle only as the second criterion, then we can always construct
transitive social preference relations. This holds true whether we restrict the
range of egalitarian-reference bundles or not. However, there is also a serious
drawback. With the equity-ﬁrst principle, we cannot have continuous social
preference relations.
Proposition 4 There exists a social preference function satisfying
Egalitarian-Equivalence, E-Conditional Pareto, Completeness, and Transi-
tivity. However, there does not exist a social preference function satisfying
Egalitarian-Equivalence, E-Conditional Pareto, and Continuity together.
Proof. Let fPS L be the lexicographic reﬁnement of the Pazner-Schmeidler
function. For each RN ∈R n, let  PS L = fPS L(RN). Deﬁne a social prefer-
ence function f as follows: For each RN ∈R n,   = f(RN) is deﬁned by:
∀x,y ∈ X,
(i) if x  E y, then x   y; and
(ii) if x   E y and y   E x, then x   y ⇔ x  PS L y.
12By (i), f sataisﬁes Egalitarian-Equivalence. Since fPS L satisﬁes Pareto, it
follows from (ii) that f satisﬁes E-Conditional Pareto. Because fPS L satisﬁes
Completeness, so does f. To check Transitivity of f, let RN ∈R n be given,
and let x,y,z ∈ X be such that x   y and y   z. We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: z ∈ E.
From (i) and y   z, we must have y ∈ E. By the same reasoning, x ∈ E.
Hence, x   y and y   z hold only if x  PS L y and y  PS L z. Because  PS L
is transitive, x  PS L z. By (ii), x   z.
Case 2: z/ ∈ E and y ∈ E.
By the same argument as in Case 1, x ∈ E. Then, from (i), we have x   z.
Case 3: z/ ∈ E and y/ ∈ E.
If x ∈ E, then by (i), x   z.I fx/ ∈ E, then x   y and y   z imply x  PS L y
and y  PS L z. Hence, x  PS L z and so x   z.
Therefore, f satisﬁes Transitivity.
Next, we prove the second part. Let f be a social preference function
satisfying Egalitarian-Equivalence and E-Conditional Pareto. We show that
f must violate Continuity. Let RN ∈R n be such that Ri = Rj for all
i,j ∈ N. Let   = f(RN). Deﬁne x ∈ X by xi =( 1 ,...,1) ∈ Rm
+ for all
i ∈ N. Clearly, x ∈ E. Deﬁne a sequence of allocations {yt} by:








+. Let i,j ∈ N be
such that i>j . For each t, because yt
i   yt
j and Ri = Rj, there cannot
exist y0 ∈ Rm
+ such that yt
i Ii y0 and yt
j Ij y0. Thus, for all t, yt  ∈ E.B y
Egalitarian-Equivalence, x   yt for all t. On the other hand, limt→∞ yt = z
where z =( 2 ,...,2) ∈ Rm
+. It is clear that z ∈ E. Since x,z ∈ E and
z  P x, by E-Conditional Pareto, we have z   x. This means that the set
{w ∈ X | x   w} is not closed.
5 Maximal Allocations in an Edgeworth Box
In this section, we study the maximal elements in an Edgeworth box of social
preference relations based on the eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle or the equity-ﬁrst
principle with egalitarian-equivalence as the concept of equity. As Tadenuma
(2002) showed, when no-envy is the concept of equity, the set of maximal
elements of the coarsest eﬃciency-ﬁrst relation is in general diﬀerent from the
set of maximal elements of the coarsest equity-ﬁrst relation. More precisely,
the former set is a proper subset of the latter set, and when individuals’
preferences are not convex, the former set may be empty while the latter set is
13always non-empty. In contrast with these results, when we adopt egalitarian-
equivalence as the concept of equity, the set of maximal elements of the
coarsest eﬃciency-ﬁrst relation always coincides with that of the coarsest
equity-ﬁrst relation. Moreover, the set is non-empty even if individuals’
preferences are not convex. The results hold true whether we restrict the
range of reference bundles or not. (Hence, we only present the results for the
case where no restriction is imposed on the range.) It should be noted that
despite the fact that the eﬃciency-ﬁrst relation may have a cycle when we
impose no restriction on the range of reference bundles, and despite the fact
that the equity-ﬁrst relation lacks continuity, there exist maximal elements
of these relations in the Edgeworth box.
The basic facts underlying these contrasting results are the following.
Consider two selection procedures from an Edgeworth box. In the ﬁrst pro-
cedure, we ﬁrst choose the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations in the whole
Edgeworth box, and secondly select the set of equitable allocations in the
Pareto set. In the second procedure, by contrast, we ﬁrst choose the set of
equitable allocations in the whole Edgeworth box, and secondly select the
set of allocations that are not Pareto-dominated by any equitable allocation.
When no-envy is the concept of equity, the two sets obtained through these
two procedures are in general diﬀerent. However, if we adopt egalitarian-
equivalence as the concept of equity, then the two sets always coincide as the
next lemma shows.
Fix Ω ∈ Rm
++ and let Z = {x ∈ X |

i∈N xi ≤ Ω}.
Lemma 1 For all RN ∈R n, P(E(Z)) = P(Z) ∩ E(Z).
Proof. Let RN ∈R n be given. If x ∈ P(Z) ∩ E(Z), then x ∈ E(Z), and
for all y ∈ Z, and in particular, all y ∈ E(Z), y   P x. Hence, x ∈ P(E(Z)).
Thus, P(Z) ∩ E(Z) ⊂ P(E(Z)).
To show that P(E(Z)) ⊂ P(Z) ∩ E(Z), let x ∈ P(E(Z)). Obviously,
x ∈ E(Z). Suppose that x  ∈ P(Z). Then, there exists y ∈ Z with y  P x.
Since Ri is strictly monotonic for all i ∈ N, there exists z ∈ Z such that
zi Pi xi for all i ∈ N. Because x ∈ E(Z), there is a0 ∈ Z such that xi Ii a0
for all i ∈ N. Hence, zi Pi a0 for all i ∈ N. By continuity of Ri, there exist
α>1 such that zi Pi αa0 for all i ∈ N. For each i ∈ N, there exists βi < 1
with βizi Ii αa0. Deﬁne βz ≡ (β1z1,...,β nzn). Then, βz is egalitarian-
equivalent with αa0 being the reference bundle. Since z is feasible, so is βz.
Thus, βz ∈ E(Z). For all i ∈ N, βizi Ii αa0 Pi a0 Ii xi. Hence, βz  P x.
This means that x  ∈ P(E(Z)), which is a contradiction.
14Proposition 5 If a social preference function f satisﬁes
(i) Weak Pareto and P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence,o r
(ii) Egalitarian-Equivalence and E-Conditional Pareto,
then, for all RN ∈R n, M(Z, ) ⊂ P(Z) ∩ E(Z).
Proof. Assume that a social preference function f satisﬁes Weak Pareto
and P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence. Let RN ∈R n be given. Let
x ∈ M(Z, ). Suppose that x/ ∈ P(Z). Then there exists y ∈ Z with
y  P x. Since Ri is strictly monotonic for all i ∈ N, there exists z ∈ Z such
that zi Pi xi for all i ∈ N. By Weak Pareto, z   x and hence x/ ∈ M(Z, ),
which is a contradiction. Thus, x ∈ P(Z). Suppose that x/ ∈ E(Z). From
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978), there exists y ∈ P(Z) ∩ E(Z). Since both x
and y are in P(Z), x   P y and y   P x. Moreover, y  E x. By P-Conditional
Egalitarian-Equivalence, y   x. This contradicts x ∈ M(Z, ). Therefore,
x ∈ P(Z) ∩ E(Z).
Next, assume that a social preference function f satisﬁes Egalitarian-
Equivalence and E-Conditional Pareto. Let RN ∈R n be given. Let x ∈
M(Z, ). If x/ ∈ E(Z), then by Egalitarian-Equivalence, for any y ∈ E(Z)  =
∅, y   x, which contradicts x ∈ M(Z, ). Thus, x ∈ E(Z). Suppose that
x/ ∈ P(E(Z)). Since x ∈ E(Z), this holds true only if there exists y ∈ E(Z)
with y  P x. Then, by E-Conditional Pareto, y   x, which is in contradiction
with x ∈ M(Z, ). Thus, x ∈ P(E(Z)). By Lemma 1, x ∈ P(Z) ∩ E(Z).
Let RN ∈R n be given. Deﬁne the strict social preferece relation  PE as
follows:
∀x,y ∈ X: x  PE y ⇔ [x  P y]o r[ x   P y,y   P x and x  E y].
Then, deﬁne the social preference relation  PE by
∀x,y ∈ X: x  PE y ⇔ y   PE x.
Deﬁne the social preference function fPE by fPE(RN)= PE for all RN ∈
Rn. If a social preference function f satisﬁes Weak Pareto and P-Conditional
Egalitarian-Equivalence, then for all x,y ∈ X, x  PE y ⇒ x   y. Hence,
fPE is the coarsest social preference function that satisﬁes Weak Pareto and
P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence.
Similarly, given RN ∈R n, deﬁne  EP as follows:
∀x,y ∈ X: x  EP y ⇔ [x  E y]o r[ x   E y,y   E x and x  P y].
Then, deﬁne  EP by:
∀x,y ∈ X: x  EP y ⇔ y   EP x.
The social preference function fEP deﬁned by fEP(RN)= EP is the
15coarsest social preference function satisfying Egalitarian-Equivalence and E-
Conditional Pareto.
Proposition 6 For all RN ∈R n, M(Z, PE)=M(Z, EP)=P(Z) ∩
E(Z).
Proof. Let RN ∈R n be given. By Proposition 5, M(Z, PE) ⊂ P(Z) ∩
E(Z). To show that P(Z) ∩E(Z) ⊂ M(Z, PE), assume x ∈ P(Z) ∩ E(Z).
Then, for all y ∈ Z, y   P x, and since x ∈ E(Z), y   E x. Hence, y   PE x.
Thus, x ∈ M(Z, PE). Therefore, M(Z, PE)=P(Z) ∩ E(Z).
Next, we show that P(E(Z)) ⊂ M(Z, EP). Assume x ∈ P(E(Z)). Let
y ∈ Z. Since x ∈ E(Z), we have y   E x.I f x   E y, then y is also in
E(Z), and because x ∈ P(E(Z)), y   P x. Hence, y   EP x. It follows that
x ∈ M(Z, EP). Thus, P(E(Z)) ⊂ M(Z, EP).
By Proposition 5 and Lemma 1, we have that M(Z, EP)=P(Z)∩E(Z).
6 Concluding Remarks
In the literature of fair allocation theory, many authors have investigated the
existence and properties of allocations that are egalitarian-equivalent and
Pareto eﬃcient in the whole feasible set. However, the concept of egalitarian-
equivalence is also useful to construct reasonable social preference relations
over all allocations. As we have shown, the properties of social preference
functions reﬂecting the idea of equity are much diﬀerent depending on (i) to
which criterion we give priority, Pareto or equity-as-egalitarian-equivalence,
and (ii) how we restrict the range of egalitarian-reference consumption bun-
dles if Pareto is given priority.
As for the maximal allocations, however, there arises no essential dif-
ference between the two principles. The set of maximal allocations of the
coarsest eﬃciency-ﬁrst social preferences and that of the coarsest equity-ﬁrst
social preferences coincide, and the set of maximal allocations of any social
preferences based on either the eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle or the equity-ﬁrst
principle is a subset of this set. This result is in marked contrast with the
case where no-envy is adopted as the concept of equity.
In the problem of distributing ﬁxed amounts of social endowments of
commodities, Pazner and Schmeidler (1978), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996,
162001) and Fleurbaey (2001) make ethical arguments to justify taking refer-
ence consumption bundles proportional to the vector of social endowments.
Our results show that if we would like not only to identify the “optimal”
allocations but also to construct acyclic social preference relations over all
allocations, respecting the eﬃciency-ﬁrst and equity-second principle, then it
is logically inevitable to take one monotone path from the origin along which
reference bundles are taken. Further investigation for ethical principles to
justify a particular monotone path of reference bundles, which may depend
on the features of each economic model, should be left for future researches.
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